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mirror of https://github.com/docker/docker-credential-helpers.git synced 2026-06-13 16:01:28 +05:30
Files
docker-credential-helpers/.github/workflows/build.yml
T
Sebastiaan van Stijn 806dc5f678 update to go1.25.6
This releases includes 6 security fixes following the security policy:

- archive/zip: denial of service when parsing arbitrary ZIP archives

    archive/zip used a super-linear file name indexing algorithm that is invoked the first time a file in an archive is opened. This can lead to a denial of service when consuming a maliciously constructed ZIP archive.

    Thanks to Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2025-61728 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77102.

- net/http: memory exhaustion in Request.ParseForm

    When parsing a URL-encoded form net/http may allocate an unexpected amount of
    memory when provided a large number of key-value pairs. This can result in a
    denial of service due to memory exhaustion.

    Thanks to jub0bs for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2025-61726 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77101.

- crypto/tls: Config.Clone copies automatically generated session ticket keys, session resumption does not account for the expiration of full certificate chain

    The Config.Clone methods allows cloning a Config which has already been passed
    to a TLS function, allowing it to be mutated and reused.

    If Config.SessionTicketKey has not been set, and Config.SetSessionTicketKeys has
    not been called, crypto/tls will generate random session ticket keys and
    automatically rotate them. Config.Clone would copy these automatically generated
    keys into the returned Config, meaning that the two Configs would share session
    ticket keys, allowing sessions created using one Config could be used to resume
    sessions with the other Config. This can allow clients to resume sessions even
    though the Config may be configured such that they should not be able to do so.

    Config.Clone no longer copies the automatically generated session ticket keys.
    Config.Clone still copies keys which are explicitly provided, either by setting
    Config.SessionTicketKey or by calling Config.SetSessionTicketKeys.

    This issue was discoverd by the Go Security team while investigating another
    issue reported by Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq).

    Additionally, on the server side only the expiration of the leaf certificate, if
    one was provided during the initial handshake, was checked when considering if a
    session could be resumed. This allowed sessions to be resumed if an intermediate
    or root certificate in the chain had expired.

    Session resumption now takes into account of the full chain when determining if
    the session can be resumed.

    Thanks to Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq) for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2025-68121 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77113.

- cmd/go: bypass of flag sanitization can lead to arbitrary code execution

    Usage of 'CgoPkgConfig' allowed execution of the pkg-config
    binary with flags that are not explicitly safe-listed.

    To prevent this behavior, compiler flags resulting from usage
    of 'CgoPkgConfig' are sanitized prior to invoking pkg-config.

    Thank you to RyotaK (https://ryotak.net) of GMO Flatt Security Inc.
    for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2025-61731 and go.dev/issue/77100.

- cmd/go: unexpected code execution when invoking toolchain

    The Go toolchain supports multiple VCS which are used retrieving modules and
    embedding build information into binaries.

    On systems with Mercurial installed (hg) downloading modules (e.g. via go get or
    go mod download) from non-standard sources (e.g. custom domains) can cause
    unexpected code execution due to how external VCS commands are constructed.

    On systems with Git installed, downloading and building modules with malicious
    version strings could allow an attacker to write to arbitrary files on the
    system the user has access to. This can only be triggered by explicitly
    providing the malicious version strings to the toolchain, and does not affect
    usage of @latest or bare module paths.

    The toolchain now uses safer VCS options to prevent misinterpretation of
    untrusted inputs. In addition, the toolchain now disallows module version
    strings prefixed with a "-" or "/" character.

    Thanks to splitline (@splitline) from DEVCORE Research Team for reporting this
    issue.

    This is CVE-2025-68119 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/77099.

- crypto/tls: handshake messages may be processed at the incorrect encryption level

    During the TLS 1.3 handshake if multiple messages are sent in records that span
    encryption level boundaries (for instance the Client Hello and Encrypted
    Extensions messages), the subsequent messages may be processed before the
    encryption level changes. This can cause some minor information disclosure if a
    network-local attacker can inject messages during the handshake.

    Thanks to Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq) for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2025-61730 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/76443

View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.25.6

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2026-01-19 14:21:10 +01:00

212 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML

name: build
# Default to 'contents: read', which grants actions to read commits.
#
# If any permission is set, any permission not included in the list is
# implicitly set to "none".
#
# see https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches:
- 'main'
tags:
- 'v*'
pull_request:
env:
DESTDIR: ./bin
GO_VERSION: 1.25.6
jobs:
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30 # guardrails timeout for the whole job
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
target:
- lint
- validate-vendor
steps:
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-
name: Run
run: |
make ${{ matrix.target }}
test:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 30 # guardrails timeout for the whole job
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os:
- ubuntu-24.04
- ubuntu-22.04
- macOS-15-intel
- macOS-15
- macOS-14
- windows-2022
steps:
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }}
-
name: Install deps (ubuntu)
if: startsWith(matrix.os, 'ubuntu-')
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y dbus-x11 gnome-keyring libsecret-1-dev pass
-
name: Install deps (macOS)
if: startsWith(matrix.os, 'macOS-')
run: |
brew install pass
-
name: GPG conf
if: ${{ !startsWith(matrix.os, 'windows-') }}
uses: actions/github-script@v8
id: gpg
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
const gnupgfolder = `${require('os').homedir()}/.gnupg`;
if (!fs.existsSync(gnupgfolder)){
fs.mkdirSync(gnupgfolder);
}
fs.copyFile('.github/workflows/fixtures/gpg.conf', `${gnupgfolder}/gpg.conf`, (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
core.setOutput('key', fs.readFileSync('.github/workflows/fixtures/7D851EB72D73BDA0.key', {encoding: 'utf8'}));
core.setOutput('passphrase', fs.readFileSync('.github/workflows/fixtures/7D851EB72D73BDA0.pass', {encoding: 'utf8'}));
-
name: Import GPG key
if: ${{ !startsWith(matrix.os, 'windows-') }}
uses: crazy-max/ghaction-import-gpg@v6
with:
gpg_private_key: ${{ steps.gpg.outputs.key }}
passphrase: ${{ steps.gpg.outputs.passphrase }}
trust_level: 5
-
name: Init pass
if: ${{ !startsWith(matrix.os, 'windows-') }}
run: |
pass init 7D851EB72D73BDA0
shell: bash
-
name: Test
run: |
make test COVERAGEDIR=${{ env.DESTDIR }}
shell: bash
-
name: Upload coverage
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v5
with:
files: ${{ env.DESTDIR }}/coverage.txt
token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
test-sandboxed:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30 # guardrails timeout for the whole job
steps:
-
name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-
name: Test
uses: docker/bake-action@v6
with:
targets: test
set: |
*.cache-from=type=gha,scope=test
*.cache-to=type=gha,scope=test,mode=max
-
name: Upload coverage
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v5
with:
files: ${{ env.DESTDIR }}//coverage.txt
token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30 # guardrails timeout for the whole job
permissions:
# required to create GitHub release
contents: write
steps:
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
-
name: Set up QEMU
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-
name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-
name: Build
run: |
make release
env:
CACHE_FROM: type=gha,scope=build
CACHE_TO: type=gha,scope=build,mode=max
-
name: List artifacts
run: |
tree -nh ${{ env.DESTDIR }}
-
name: Check artifacts
run: |
find ${{ env.DESTDIR }} -type f -exec file -e ascii -e text -- {} +
-
name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: docker-credential-helpers
path: ${{ env.DESTDIR }}/*
if-no-files-found: error
-
name: GitHub Release
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@a06a81a03ee405af7f2048a818ed3f03bbf83c7b # v2.5.0
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
with:
draft: true
files: ${{ env.DESTDIR }}/*
build-deb:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 30 # guardrails timeout for the whole job
steps:
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
-
name: Build
run: |
make deb